
Functionalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aug 24, 2004 · Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this …
Functionalism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aug 24, 2004 · Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this …
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Jan 12, 2000 · Functionalism identifies mental states and processes by means of their causal roles, and as noted above in connection with Lewis, we know that the functional roles are …
Multiple Realizability - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Nov 23, 1998 · Functionalism, on the other hand, seems to be at the correct level of abstraction up from explanations of behavior based on physical mechanisms. In particular, it seems …
The Computational Theory of Mind (Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Oct 16, 2015 · According to functionalism, a system has a mind when the system has a suitable functional organization. Mental states are states that play appropriate roles in the system’s …
The Chinese Room Argument - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Mar 19, 2004 · Functionalism is an alternative to the identity theory that is implicit in much of Searle’s discussion, as well as to the dominant behaviorism of the mid-twentieth Century. If …
Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aug 20, 1997 · Inner states that are physically very different may nonetheless feel the same. What is crucial to what it is like is functional role, not underlying hardware. There are two …
Teleological Theories of Mental Content (Stanford Encyclopedia of ...
Jun 18, 2004 · That said, the distinction between functionalism and what might be termed “teleo-functionalism” is less stark than might be thought (cf. Neander 2017, 90). One reason is that …
Introspection (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Feb 2, 2010 · Beliefs, and other belief-like mental states like judgments, one might think, contain concepts, not conscious experiences, as their constituents (Fodor 1998); or, alternatively, one …
Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation - Stanford Encyclopedia of …
Dec 8, 1997 · In its modern guise, ST was established in 1986, with the publication of Robert Gordon’s “Folk Psychology as Simulation” and Jane Heal’s “Replication and Functionalism”. …